# **Fireworks Factory Complexes Policy**

## Summary of submission and Replies – 2<sup>nd</sup> Public Consultation stage

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
FC-2013/001-2	Mr. Dione Farrugia	Is this policy retroactive; requesting the existing factories to abide themselves with the new regulations, irrespective if they either want to upgrade or otherwise?  Re Designation of Safety Buffer Zones	No, the policy is not retroactive and applies solely to the planning aspect of the issue. Retrofitting and upgrading is however contemplated
		5.1 All fireworks factory Complexes (new and existing) are to have a designated safety buffer zone around them in accordance with the relevant legislation. Within such zones no further development, that may in any way jeopardize the continued operation and/or licensing of the said fireworks factory complexes, is to be permitted. It is imperative that the safety buffer zone must be fully owned by the same owners of the complex and not including the property owned by third parties. Not abiding with this recommendation will automatically impose such regulation to these owners who have nothing to do with the pyrotechnic activity with the possibility in incurring a financial loss when trying to sell their property.	This is a planning condition has nothing to do with ownership but is indicated to alerting third parties on undertaking incompatible investment within an area of higher potential risk.
FC/2013/002-2	Mr. Gordon Grech Fireworks Manufacturer	Kont nistenna policy diretti ta kif jinbnew kmar tan nar u anki upgrading ta dawk ezistenti. Disin ta kmamar kif iridu jimbnew u aktar safe. Jekk hafna areas gew skedati	Dettalji dwar kif jimbnew il-kmamar tan-nar thallew f'idejn il-kumitat li ser jigi mahtur mil-Gvern ghal-dan il-ghan.

Ref no	Name	bhala highlandscape value fejn jistghu jimbnew kmamar godda? Kont nistenna li jsir studju biex jigu identifikati I postijiet possibli. Hija I mepa arma d tara I applikazjoni u mhux xi hadd indipendenti. Nispera ukoll li biex wiehed japplika ma jhallasx ammont kbir u jkun hemm pjan li kull arma tan nar ezistenti tkun tista tapplika biex tirranga I post permezz ta notifika u mhux full application. Gordon Grech planning officer MEPA u nahdem I arti piroteknika b mod volontarju ghal festa.	Reply Ghalkemm postijiet adattati mhumiex specifikament indikati, wiehed jista jasal ghalihom billi jezamina fejn il-kmamar tannar ma jistghux isir jew inkella postijiet fejn m'humiex inkoraggiti.  Il-metodu ta' kif wiehed japplika huwa punt amministrattiv u mhux materjal li jigi inkluz f'din il-"policy"
FC/2013/003-2	Mr. Mario Vella Elmo Insurance Ltd	First of all many thanks for giving us members of the public the chance to comment re fireworks factories. Fireworks are and forever should remain an integral part of the Maltese society, traditional, cultural and most artistic too. But before any discussion on NEW factories is even considered, I feel first and foremost we must make sure that ALL existing factories are adhering to all legal requirements.	Although a number of legal requirements lie outside the direct remit of the policy, the policy is indirectly encouraging upgrading to this effect
		Are we sure all existing factories observe the legally required distance of 200 meters from inhabited buildings/farmhouses? What right does anyone have to put at fatal risk the lives of people living/working within the buffer zone? Since we all know that land within the buffer zone does not belong to the firework factory, what right does anyone have to deprive these property owners from enjoying their property, be it through	Legal Distances and other legal requirements are regulated by other authorities and do not fall within the scope of this policy.

Ref no	Name	<b>Summary</b> farming, cultivation and or simple enjoyment.	Reply
		Not only no protection whatsoever is being afforded to innocent neighbouring third parties, but I suggest fireworks factories should be made to OWN at least the land within the buffer zone and not jeopardize the lives and properties of these people Are we saying a farmer tilling his fields within the buffer zone have no right to be there, in what even the law considers a DANGEROUS ZONE? Therefore fireworks factories must OWN or at least obtain lease the surrounding buffer zone. I sincerely hope this important aspect of buffer zone security is not overlooked.	The policy is not discouraging traditional farming activities. It is simply adopting the buffers already contemplated by law to alert third parties about the activity with the main focus being non-farming related buildings.
FC/2013/004-2	Perit Alexander Bigeni obo Mr. Angelo Parnis Fireworks Manufacturer	I am writing on behalf of Mr. Angelo Parnis, (owner of license B for the manufacturing of fireworks). Mr. Parnis, who resides in Gozo would like to point out the following:	
		<ol> <li>There is a need for the construction of new fireworks factories in Gozo, given that there is a large number of licenses (about 150) and just 3 licensed factories;</li> </ol>	Noted
		<ol> <li>The policy forbids the development of sites in Grade 1 and Grade 2 scheduled areas;</li> </ol>	Yes
		3. It is to be noted that the majority of	Areas of High Landscape value do not

Ref no	Name	Summary  ODZ sites in Gozo (where fireworks factories can be developed) consist of Areas of high landscape value, Scheduled sites or areas of scientific value. This is better indicated in the attached excerpts from the Gozo and Comino Local plan.	Reply constitute an automatic disqualifier. Proposals in these areas would need to be examined on a case by cases basis.
		4. Given 3 and 4 above, this would greatly restrict the development of such factories in Gozo, with a risk for the proliferation of illegal factories on the island. It is being hence suggested that such development is only prohibited in areas in Grade 1.	It is felt that there are sufficient qualifying areas in Gozo where fireworks factories can be built
		Scheduled sites. Proposed structures should be screened by means of well designed landscaping.	There is provision for this in the policy
FC/2013/005-2	Mr. S. Azzopardi (Occupational Safety, Health & Env.Consultant) Fireworks Manufacturer	Art 3.3.1 The use of wood should be considered as main construction material so as to erect adequate single compartment work stations or processing rooms. These single compartment rooms should increase safety aspects by:	The choice of material and the design features are matters which are being left to the ad hoc technical committee indicated in para 3.3.4 of the policy.
		<ul> <li>a) Reducing available workspace and hence reducing excessive pyrotechnic material within the working area.</li> <li>b) Minimising the number of workers within the same room.</li> <li>c) Reduce the travelling distance of any debris caused by an accident</li> </ul>	

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
		<ul> <li>(explosion, spontaneous combustion etc).</li> <li>d) Blast walls (constituted of natural material like soil) surrounding part-of these compartment rooms should enhance protection levels to adjacent processing rooms or third parties. Furthermore, being a renewable material, wood causes low impact vis-a-vis environmental aspects.</li> </ul>	
		Art 3.3.2 The planting of trees within a fireworks factory may increase hazards and risks directly related to lightning strikes. I urge you to reconsider this issue.	This would be a matter to be seen by the ad hoc technical committee mentioned in para 3.3.4. Fireworks factories abroad are often surrounded by trees but appropriate lightning protection measures are employed. Removal of trees does not remove the risk of lightning strikes as even incidents from the local context illustrate.
FC/2013/006-2	Dr. Kevin Ghirxi Head of Marine Safety Investigation Marine Safety Investigation Unit	Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft policy. As a pyrotechnics enthusiast, this is surely going in the right direction. The document is well written and comprehensive.	Thanks for the kind remarks
		It is also appropriate that the document considers not only new facilities but also the upgrading of existing ones.	The policy does contemplate upgrading to existing fireworks complexes.
		To this effect, I am of the view that section 2.0 of the Policy may need to address at least two more definitions. The Policy is not clear as to what is a 'new fireworks complex' and 'upgrading of existing	Para 4.1 has been amended to further clarify further on the issue

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		facilities'. For instance, in the case of an	
		accident which results in the partial	
		structural failure of the complex, will the	
		construction be considered as a new	
		complex? Then, what are the criteria which	
		will constitute an upgrade of the complex?	
		Of utmost importance is section 3.3.4. The	Noted and communicated to the relevant
		scrutiny by an 'ad hoc committee' is crucial.	authorities
		However, it does seem that the onus to	
		"assess and reduce associated risks" has	
		been transferred to this Committee. I am of	
		the opinion that the assessment of risk is	
		the responsibility of the licensee (and so are	
		the costs for this assessment). I believe	
		that the role of the 'ad hoc committee' is to	
		ensure that the risk assessment meets a	
		pre -determined criteria and to seek further	
		clarifications in this respect. Further to	
		necessitating the licensee to assess the risk,	
		it should also be made mandatory for risk	
		assessments to be submitted to the 'ad hoc	
		committee' for the necessary scrutiny and	
		this should be part of the requirements for	
		the clearance from this Committee.	
		Especially for complexes which would	
		require reconstruction (either partial or	
		complete) after an accident, the policy	
		should mention in section 3.3.4 that the 'ad	
		hoc committee' should also take into	
		consideration the findings of the	
		investigation into the accident in that	
		particular complex. It is possible that the	
		way the complex was built would have	
		contributed to the accident. It is simply unconceivable that complexes are	
		reconstructed within a month of the	

Ref no	Name	<b>Summary</b> accident when the investigation would not have been concluded.	Reply
FC/2013/007-2	Prof. Alfred J.Vella Dept. of Chemistry University of Malta	My view is that this policy is mainly intended to signal the 'change of heart' which MEPA seems to have experienced recently in the sense that it now appears more ready to consider approving applications for new fireworks factories than it may have been some time ago. It was a finding in the "Vella Commission Report" of 2011 that MEPA's apparent unwillingness to approve new firework factories was an additional risk factor militating in favour of increased frequency of firework manufacturing accidents. This in view of the fact that loss of factory facilities resulting from accidental destruction brought about an increase in work-load in the remaining factories with concomitant risk of more frequent or graver accidents. It bears noting that a main cause of fireworks manufacturing accidents is believed to be human error largely due to lack of attention to proper safety practices but also to pressure of work to meet possibly unrealistic production targets and deadlines. So, permitting new factories and upgrading old factories can be a positive development.	One of the objectives of the policy was safety related and the "Vella" report was one of the documents that was examined by the committee.
		Specific issues concerning some details in the proposed policy Re: article 3.1.1: This article refers to a fireworks factory complex as being made up of processing rooms and also of 'magazines' (plural). Current police regulations (shown	Noted. The policy is written in such a manner that it automatically takes on board the relevant changes in legislation that may take place in the future. This has the

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		in Annex II, attached to policy, article 8) refer to distances of the various processing rooms from the "main storage area" (in the singular). Clearly, if factories are to be allowed to have more than one magazine for storage of finished work, then the police regulations regarding distances need to be revisited. Also, the regulation in the Explosives Ordinance (Chapter 33) pertaining to the safety buffer zone defined by a specific distance of a firework factory from nearest neighbours, set at 183 m between the centre point of the (single) magazine and the neighbour, will have to be amended somehow to accord with this concept of multiple storage areas. More importantly, it is not clear why it is advantageous to create more than one magazine in a factory complex, considering the disadvantages that could ensue due to the need to respect safety distances from multiple processing rooms within the same complex.	additional advantage of not have to change the planning policy document each time regulations related to safety distances are amended.
		Re article 3.2.3: Allowing construction within the buffer zones of potable water boreholes or galleries is not a good idea unless very special and expensive precautions are taken to address the possibility of damage to the water table from infiltration of seriously contaminated water. Several materials used in fireworks manufacture consist of readily water-soluble substances as nitrates, chlorates and perchlorates. In the event of an accidental explosion, a great deal of water may be doused on the burning structures for fire-	The committee has already been already been alerted by the relevant authorities on this matter and hence 3.2.3 was included s that consultations to this effect with the respective agencies takes place.

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		fighting purposes: this water will likely pick up soluble toxic chemicals from the materials stored on site, including material from finished articles and chemical stockpiles. Unless provision is included in the permit to re-route such possible contaminated runoff away from the recharge area of the aquifer, construction of a factory should be not be permitted.	
		Re article 3.3.1: It is unfortunate that under 'design criteria' no mention is made of a preference for constructing new factories using special light-weight building materials rather than conventional concrete and stone masonry. Lighter elements which, crucially, are properly anchored to the ground, could avoid loss of life from collapse of the structure resulting from accidental explosion.	Materials were discussed at length and it was agreed that this is best left to the appointed ad hoc technical committee mentioned in para 3.3.4. There may be instances where stronger material might prove to be a better option. A one size fits all approach was avoided in this respect. The ad hoc technical committee would be entrusted to take into account the different situations
		Establishing a quota for potassium perchlorate. An overarching consideration which may not be a planning issue but is certainly central to ensuring a safer future for fireworks factories concerns the amendment of the Police Regulations (Annex II) pertaining to use of oxidising agents in the manufacture of fireworks.	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities
		It is a dangerous situation to allow the industry to manufacture, almost without limit, as many fireworks as it determines since use of potassium perchlorate is currently not regulated. The law in Malta limits the amount of potassium nitrate and	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities

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		potassium chlorate that can be converted into fireworks per year but it leaves use of potassium perchlorate unregulated. Controlling the use of this oxidising agent will have the effect of capping the amount of fireworks that can be manufactured and this will serve to calm the pressure to produce, which at present, is only controlled by financial considerations. Unless the amount of this material is limited by law, the policy to allow more fireworks factories to come on stream may not serve sufficiently to ensure a safe and accident-free future.	
		Total annual firework production and use cannot be allowed to spiral upwards without any control and this not only to protect the manufacturers themselves but equally importantly because of the impact which toxic solid wastes from fireworks are exerting on the local environment. Together with my students, we have been studying the effect of fireworks on environmental quality for several years and some of the results are in scientific literature (see references 1 and 2). There is clear evidence that for at least 3 months during the summer, the air quality over both Malta and Gozo is significantly and negatively influenced by metal-containing wastes deriving from fireworks displays. There is clear evidence of contamination by perchlorate of local dust fall, house dust, and also crops and occasionally drinking water and the only known significant source of perchlorate in Malta is fireworks. We	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities

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		have found this chemical present in our environment in studies spanning over more than 5 years: its concentration peaks during the festa summer months and then declines but never disappearing completely during the non-festive period to re-appear again during the next summer. Research work in this area is ongoing in our laboratory but I feel we have enough evidence to show that the impact of fireworks on the quality of our	
		environment is real and persistent and may be having an effect on human health, especially of the more sensitive members of the population. Perchlorate is a toxic chemical and interferes with thyroid function in humans; the effects of exposure to the chemical at low concentrations for a prolonged, indeed, indefinite period, are not known.	
		The upgrading and proliferation of fireworks manufacturing facilities must be accompanied by a perchlorate quota to limit total production or else this planning policy threatens to become a vehicle for profound and insidious environmental degradation and a health risk to all persons living on the islands.	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities
		Principal conclusion Developing a policy to permit new factories and upgrade existing ones can be a positive development provided that it is understood that a larger number of better constructed facilities can lower the stress and pressure of production against a set, non-upwardly moving, and manufacturing target. If	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities

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		production continues to escalate, because of unbridled use of potassium perchlorate, the objectives of safer manufacture may not be met, and worse still, other negative effects shall come into play to affect not just the safety and health of the manufacturing community itself but that of the unsuspecting island nation at large.	
		References 1. Camilleri R and Vella AJ (2010) Effect of fireworks on ambient air quality in Malta, Atmospheric Environment, 44, 4521 - 4527. 2. Vella AJ, Aquilina B, Delicata F and Farrugia A (2012) Perchlorates in dust fall: evidence of environmental contamination by fireworks in Malta. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Symposium on Fireworks April 23-27, 2012, Valletta Malta, International Symposium of Fireworks, 389 - 400.	
FC/2013/009-2	Mr. Michael D.Spiteri Emergency Dept. MDH	In view of the ongoing public consultation process with respect to the new fireworks factories policy, please find the feedback from the Emergency Department at Mater Dei hospital. This department is responsible for the provision and deployment of the national emergency ambulance service and pre-hospital medical care during a fireworks incident and also provides medical management in case of a mass casualty event. This feedback is being based on our experience in previous incidents which involved fireworks factories.	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities
		Proposal 1: The MSDS for the most frequent	Noted and communicated to the relevant

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		chemicals utilised in the production of fireworks should be made available to the Emergency Department at Mater Dei Hospital. This will help us direct our treatment in case of intoxications.	authorities
		Proposal 2: We have noted that the minimum road width leading to an incident site has been fixed at no less than 3.7 meters. Although this width is enough for our vehicles to approach, we would like to draw your attention that in the past we had serious problems with vehicle overtaking. In fact we had many incidents in which our ambulances were blocked inside the incident site. We are very aware that widening the roads any further is almost impossible. Therefore we are proposing that a sign is erected at the start of the uninterrupted 3.7 meter wide road. This sign should clearly state the name and number of the factory that it leads to, the distance from the sign to the fireworks factory and inform the driver that overtaking beyond that point might prove to be impossible. This provision will allow responders to improve scene management and safety.	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities
FC/2013/010-2	Joseph Micallef	Here under are my comments on the Fireworks Factory Complexes Policy:	
		This document should not be issued before the SPED exercise (revision of the structure plan) is complete and working. Firework factories are not essential for Malta hence there is no real urgency.	One of the recommendations highlighted in the "Vella Commission Report" on Fireworks practices was on the increase of such facilities as there was the risk that certain practices were going underground. This is

Ref no	Name	Summary	<b>Reply</b> one of the reasons for the urgency.
		The document does not cite its references - i.e. on what evidence/experience it is based.	This is a policy document. However the contents were based on the experience and knowledge of a number of experts from various fields. One of the documents was the "Vella Commission Report" which most certainly has a scientific basis"
		Chemicals used in factories potentially pose two types of hazards. One due to their explosive nature and one due to their toxic nature (to humans and / or the environment depending on the amount of chemicals used). The former seems to be partially addressed in the current daft but the latter has been ignored.	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities
		The site must not be over a perched aquifer or near a water course or in places subject to flooding as this would risk land/ground water contamination with the chemicals used to manufacture the fireworks.	This consideration is taken into account 3.2.3. Experts indicated that the main risk is water doused following an accident and there are measures to address this possibility.
		Other legislation / administrative requirements should be taking into account when granting a permit. i.e. the reservoir, access road. The permit should only be given if it is certain that all conditions can be met with the submitted design.  No firework factories nor the fireworks buffer zone should be located in ecological sites levels 1 to 4, sandy coastal areas, sites of scenic value, national parks,	The ad hoc technical committee indicated in section 3.3.4 is intended to address these concerns.  Whilst environmental protection issues have been taken into account, having too many constraints implies a situation where the concerns expressed in the "Vella Commission Report" would remain unaddressed. The policy strives to achieve a balance between cultural, safety, planning

Ref no	Name	archaeological sites classes a,b,c, sites of scientific importance, and sites of agricultural value. Off course we do not want to damage such sites!  No developments should be allowed in the buffer zone of firework factories - both existing and new. Since this would defeat the very purpose of the buffer zone.  Although fireworks form part of Malta's summer, they do pollute both the air and the land hence the number of firework factories should be capped.	Reply and environmental considerations.
FC/2013/011-2	Mr. Saviour Ellul Resolve Consulting Ltd.	We (Resolve Consulting Limited) wish to contribute to the ongoing public consultation with respect to the Fireworks Factory Complexes Policy, by submitting the following questions and comments:  1. What are the terms of reference of the ministerial ad hoc committee?  2. Will Occupational Health and Safety risks and their control feature in the committee's process of scrutiny?	These would be established at a later stage and lie beyond the remit if this policy.  At this point the composition of the ad hoc technical committee has not yet been determined.
		<ul> <li>3. What type of risk assessments will be requested of the developers and operators of the fireworks factory complexes?</li> <li>4. As a preventive precautionary measure, it is recommended that an ATEX study and assessment is</li> </ul>	Again something that would need to be determined at a later stage  Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities

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		carried out for each fireworks factory or extension as per the provisions of LEGAL NOTICE 41 of 2004. WORK PLACE (MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR WORK) (CONFINED SPACES AND SPACES HAVING EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES) REGULATIONS. These studies commence at design stage and continue throughout operations.	
		5. As a measure to assist the designer to minimise the effects of the consequence of an explosive event, it is recommended that a blast modelling exercise is carried out on proposed designs.	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities
		6. Road transport of flammable and/or explosive materials to and from fireworks factories influence the overall safety of the complexes. It is recommended that the L.N. 181 of 2013 TRAFFIC REGULATION ORDINANCE (CAP. 65) AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPORT IN MALTA ACT (CAP. 499) Motor Vehicles (Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013 is rigorously applied. This legislation provides for the application of the international ADR guidelines for the packaging, loading, labelling and transport of dangerous goods by road.	Noted and communicated to the relevant authorities

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
FC-2013-012-2	A. Cefai	<ol> <li>Permits for new fireworks factories should be granted outside schemes under appropriate conditions especially safety. The herein under mentioned submissions apply also to new future fireworks factories too.</li> </ol>	This is what the policy is indicating
		2. Fireworks factories (including new fireworks factories) should be placed outside schemes but otherwise they should only be excluded principally from Areas of Archaeological Importance and areas that so warrant for safety reasons including 'inter alia' requirements of law and of distances and similar requirements for better safety at all times.	The policy safeguards archaeologically sensitive areas as well as other sensitive areas
		3. The process for granting permits in connection with fireworks factories and new fireworks factories should be simplified and expedited provided that safety and similar requirements are all treated as over-riding.	Note but this is mainly an administrative matter and not something to be contemplated in a planning policy document
		4. There should not be too much limitation of sites except for the supreme reason and scope of safety.	A balance would need to be achieved to this effect
		5. It should be a principle that outside schemes lands that qualify for firework factories (including new fireworks factories) should be 'excluded' as minimally as possible and this principally for safety reasons	Presumably the reference is to incompatible development. Provisions to this effect have been included in sections 3, 4 and 5.

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
		6. Safety and similar considerations rather than strict planning considerations should be the guide to the issuing of permits for fireworks factories	This was the intention behind para 3.3.4
		7. Not much insistence should be made on the 'aesthetic blending' of fireworks factories with the surrounding areas since safety considerations should be over-riding.	A balance needs to be created between aesthetic and other considerations with the proper address of safety related issues.
		8. It shall be a general principle that land outside schemes shall be utilized in a way that the maximum number of landowners benefit from permits, subject to the over-riding consideration of absolute safety in the case of firework factories	ODZ related policies effect many players and are rather more complicated than as being suggested.
		<ol> <li>Buildings and/or structures similar to fireworks factories should be permitted under the above- mentioned conditions subject to the overriding condition of law, legal distances and all other maximum safety considerations and similar considerations.</li> </ol>	The considerations applicable to fireworks factories tend to be somewhat different from those applicable to other structures.
		10. It should be the over-riding condition that in all cases including all the abovementioned, the requirements of law and of distances and similar requirements for better safety at all times should be absolutely	Safety distances are contemplated by law and it is assumed that these would be addressed at the ad hoc technical committee stage mentioned in section 3.3.4

Ref no	Name	Summary necessary.	Reply
FC-2013-013-2	Mr. C. Dalli Mgarr Local Council	<ul> <li>Against any new permits and development of new factories in its confines, even those whereby an application for a new factory has already been submitted;</li> <li>in favour of upgrading the existing firework factories for reasons purely connected to safety and hazard-controlling aspects;</li> <li>This as to ensure the protection of the environment and the people working in the factories and living in the locality.</li> </ul>	As happens in every development planning application, the Mgarr local council would have every opportunity to react to specifics of a particular development planning application. It would be rather inappropriate to exclude a whole local council a priori without further examination of the details of a proposal especially in a situation where the Mgarr local council happens to be one of the larger ones. Agreement is registered in principle with the council's proposal on upgrading existing fireworks factories as well as the objective to protect the environment and other members of society.
FC-2013-014-2	Kummissjoni Ambjent	Bħalma għamlet f'okkażjonijiet oħra relatati ma' din it-tema1, il-Kummissjoni Interdjoċesana Ambjent (KA) tħoss id-dmir li tagħti l-fehmiet u r-reazzjonijiet tagħha għal dan id-dokument. Dan l-impenn tal-KA hu xprunat mill-importanza u r-rispett li dejjem tat lill-valur tal-ħajja. Għalhekk il-KA b'sodisfazzjon tinnota li dan id-dokument qed jagħmel il-proposti tiegħu f'qafas li jagħti l-ogħla prijorità lis-sigurtà ta' dawk li jaħdmu n-nar u tat-terzi persuni li jistgħu jintlaqtu minn din l-industrija. Il-kummenti u s-suġġerimenti tal-KA huma tentattiv sabiex jitjiebu u fl-istess ħin jissaħħu l-proposti msemmija fid-dokument. Kmamar tan-nar ġodda	Grazzi tal-kumment

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		Matul dawn l-aħħar snin, in-numru tal-kmamar tan-nar naqas minħabba l-inċidenti li saru u n-nuqqas ta' permessi li nħarġu sabiex jinbnew oħrajn flokhom. Ġara wkoll li, prinċipalment minħabba ppjanar ħażin, inħarġu permessi għal bini residenzjali viċin ta' dawn il-kmamar li mbagħad kienu għajn ta' diżgwid kbir fuq min għandu d-dritt li jokkupa l-art.	
		Minn dak imsemmi f'Sezzjonijiet 3.0 u 5.0, jidher ċar li l-bini ta' kmamar tan-nar ġodda sa jkun allokat f'siti li huma ODZ (Outside Development Zone). Dan kien ikkonfermat waqt il-laqgħa pubblika li saret fil-Boardroom tal-MEPA fit-22 ta' Jannar 2014 dwar id-dokument. Fl-istess laqgħa ssemma wkoll li n-numru ta' dawn il-kmamar tan-nar ġodda mhux mistenni jkun wieħed kbir. F'dan il-kuntest u quddiem ir-realtajiet ta' pajjiżna fejn l-ispazju disponibbli hu limitat u r-rata li bih qed jittiekel minn żvilupp mhux sostenibbli qed tkompli għaddejja, il-KA tħoss li għandu jsir eżercizzju serju ta' ppjanar sabiex (i) ikun stabbilit in-numru ta' kmamar tan-nar ġodda li jiflaħ pajjiżna (carrying capacity), (ii) ikunu identifikati s-siti li potenzjalment jistgħu jinbnew fuqhom dawn il-kmamar, u (iii) ma jitħalliex isir żvilupp ieħor f'dawn is-siti. B'dan il-mod, wieħed jevita l-kunflitti msemmija aktar 'il fuq u, b'mod tanġibbli, ikun imħares ukoll l-interess tal-industrija tal-manifattura tan-nar.	Il-kumment dwar "carrying capacity", waqt li huwa wiehed validu fuq livell ta' principju, ghandu hafna diffikultajiet meta applikat f'dan il-kuntest. Fil-fatt huwa facli hafna li wiehed jghamel argumenti li numerikament il-kmamar tan-nar li ghandna illum huma diga hafna ghal dan il-pajjiz u ghalhekk jista jsir argument biex sahansitra dawn jonqsu. Minn naha l-ohra ghandna id-dokument "Vella" li b'mod xjentifiku qed jargumenta li wahda mill-mizuri biex jonqsu l-incidenti hu li jizdiedu il-facilitiajiet. Din il-policy, iggwidata min direzzjoni governattiva, hadet id-direzzjoni tar-rapport "Vella" u pproponiet qafas ta' policy biex filwaqt li jizdiedu l-facilitajiet, jigu salvagwardjati kemm aspetti ta sigurta, ta' ippjanar u ambjentali fuq is-sit kif ukoll madwar is-sit. Li ma jithalliex zvilupp inompatibbli iehor madwar dawn is-siti gie indikat fis-sezzjoni 5.0.
		Landscaping	

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
		Filwaqt li b'sodisfazzjon tinnota l-importanza li d-dokument jagħti sabiex jitnaqqas l-impatt viżiv negattiv li jista' jkollhom dawn il-kmamar, il-KA tixtieq tiġbed l-attenzjoni dwar dak li ntqal f'Artiklu 3.3.2 dwar l-użu tas-siġar. Wieħed irid iżomm f'moħħu li s-siġar kollha – minħabba l-għoli tagħhom u l-umdità li jkollhom – jistgħu jiġbdu xi sajjetta u b'hekk ikunu huma stess ta' periklu meta mħawla madwar/ħdejn xi kamra tan-nar. L-impatt viżiv jista' xorta waħda jkun żgurat b'miżuri oħra li jkunu parti mid-disinn innifsu tal-binja (kif indikat f'Artiklu 3.3.1).	Dan l-aspett gie kunsidrat. Huwa ta importanza li wiehed jinnota li ix-xjenza tas sajjetti tindika li l-fatt li ma jkunx hemm sigar fil-vicin ma jghatix garanzija li l-kamra ma tintlaqatx. Hemm mezzi teknici ta' kif wiehed jista jindirizza din il-problema b'mod sodisfacenti.
		Principji u kriterji ta' disinn Il-KA taqbel ma' Artiklu 3.3.3 li kull deciżjoni għandha tittieħed skont in-natura tal-każ/applikazzjoni u mhux tinforza soluzzjoni waħda għall-każijiet kollha. Madanakollu, l-esperjenzi passati wrew kif 'twieqi' bħal dawn – li 'infetħu' fir- regolamenti sabiex ikunu ssimplifikati l- proceduri amministrattivi u titneħħa l- burokrazija żejda – spiss jispiccaw sabiex joffru opportunità tad-deheb lil min irid jabbuża u jagħmel gwadann personali għad- detriment tal-komunità. Għalhekk il-KA tħoss li dan id-dokument għandu jipproponi linji gwida cari li jirregolaw id-disinn tal-kmamar tan-nar. Fi kliem ieħor, il-ħtieġa li kull każ għandu jkun studjat għall-merti tiegħu ma teliminax il- bżonn li jitfasslu kriterji bażici ta' disinn li jiżguraw is-sigurtà u li jirregolaw kull żvilupp marbut mal-bini jew l- immodernizzar tal-kmamar tan-nar. Dawn	Kumment validu pero huwa mportanti li wiehed jinnota li kull applikazzjoni tkun soggetta ghal skrutiju pubbliku miftuh u dar huwa wiehed biss miss salvagwardji kontra I-imsemmija possibiltajiet ta' abbuz

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
		il-linji gwida għandhom ukoll ikunu ppubblikati.	
		Il-kumitat ad hoc Minħabba r-rwol importanti ta' dan il- kumitat (Artiklu 3.3.4), il-KA tħoss li dan id- dokument għandu jagħti indikazzjonijiet ċari ta' x'kompetenzi għandhom ikollhom il- membri li jikkomponuh. Ċertament wieħed jistenna li l-membri tal-kumitat ikunu persuni tekniċi ġejjin minn kompetenzi varji relatati mal-qasam tal-piroteknika, is- sigurtà, l-ippjanar u l-bini ta' strutturi għall- produzzjoni u l-ħażna ta' materjal pirotekniku. Kif indikat hawn fuq, dan il- kumitat għandu jkollu kriterji bażiċi u ċari li jiggwidaw id-deċiżjonijiet li jittieħdu u jiżguraw trattament ġust tat-talbiet / applikazzjonijiet li jsiru. Il-KA tfakkar li r- rwol regolatorju ta' dan il-kumitat (u tal- MEPA) ma jiqafx mal-ħruġ tal-permess. Dawn l-entitajiet għandhom iwettqu spezzjonijiet regolari u fuq medda ta' żmien sabiex jiżguraw li l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet li kienu approvati fuq il-karta jkunu dawk li fil-fatt irregolaw il-binja u li jibqgħu rispettati għas-snin li ġejjin. In-nuqqas ta' infurzar tar-regolamenti (mhux biss f'dan il- qasam) hi l-marda prinċipali li ilha ż-żmien tostakola l-kwalità tal-ħajja f'pajjiżna.	M'hix prattika li document ta' Planning Policy jghati gwida dettajata dwar kompozizzjoni jew terms of reference ta' Kumitat. Id-Dokument jillimita ruhu ghall- principju u huwa mistenni li l-imsemmija rikjesti jigu indirizzati b'mod amministrattiv aktar il-quddiem. Hemm qbil mal-KA li il- policy document u l-hrug tal-permess relattiv huma biss aspetti minn ezercizzju ferm aktar wiesgha.
		Strateģija ħolistika  Dan id-dokument hu ċertament pass fid- direzzjoni t-tajba għax joffri l-possibbiltà sabiex " jerġgħu jinbnew il-kmamar tan- nar li bħalissa huma wegfin minħabba xi	Dan il-kumment gie innutat u mghoddi lil agenziji rispettivi.

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
		problema jew oħra biex ix-xogħol jinfirex	
		aktar u ma tibqax il-pressjoni fuq il-kmamar	
		eżistenti."3 Madanakollu, dan għandu jkun	
		parti minn strateģija ħolistika li tagħmel din	
		l-industrija aktar sigura għall-persuni li	
		jaħdmu fiha, għal dawk li jgħixu fil-viċinanzi	
		u għall-ambjent – li fuq il-kwalità tiegħu	
		tiddependi l-kwalità tal-ħajja tagħna.	
		Fl-opinjonijiet imgħoddija tagħha, il-KA	
		ħarget gatta bla ħabel kontra l-eccessi	
		relatati mal-logħob tan-nar u mhux kontra	
		I-logħob tan-nar fih innifsu, minkejja li min	
		kellu motivazzjonijiet ulterjuri ried li jagħti	
		din l-impressjoni. Ir-rapport tal-	
		Kummissjoni Vella dwar I-accidenti fil-	
		kmamar tan-nar juri biċ-ċar li hemm	
		relazzjoni bejn id-dimensjoni tad-diżgrazzji	
		li seħħew u l-ammont ta' logħob tan-nar	
		maħdum u maħżun. Dan I-ammont ged	
		jiżdied kemm minħabba li ħafna mix-xogħol	
		tan-nar – li qabel kien jinħadem f'diversi	
		kmamar mifruxin ma' Malta – issa qed	
		jinħadem f'numru iżgħar ta' kmamar u	
		kemm minħabba l-ammonti eċċessivi ta' nar	
		li ged jinħadem. Dan id-dokument hu	
		għodda li biha qed tkun indirizzata l-ewwel	
		problema (jiġifieri n-nuqqas ta' kmamar).	
		Issa jeħtieġu miżuri oħra li jikkontrollaw l-	
		eċċessi. Skont komunikazzjoni li I-KA kellha	
		mal-Prof. Alfred Vella (li mexxa l-	
		Kummissjoni ta' Inkjesta fuq l-aċċidenti fil-	
		kmamar tan-nar) dan jista' jseħħ biss jekk	
		il-Gvern iniedi kontrolli fuq il-provvista ta'	
		perklorat li jintuża fil-manifattura tan-nar.	
		Dećiżjoni galbiena bħal din mhux biss tgħin	
		sabiex jongos il-periklu u l-iskala ta'	
		devastazzjoni meta jseħħ inċident, talli	

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
		tikkontrolla t-tniġġis ambjentali u l-impatti negattivi fuq is-saħħa (Kummissjoni Interdjoċesana Ambjent, 2012). Jekk din iddeċiżjoni ma titteħidx hemm il-periklu li jiġu fix-xejn il-benefiċċji li jistgħu joħorġu minn dan id-dokument propost. Dan għaliex, wara li jkunu nbnew kmamar ġodda u b'hekk ikun tnaqqas l-ammont ta' nar maħdum u maħżun f'kull kamra, mingħajr kontroll fuq l-ammont ta' nar immanifatturat, hemm iċ-ċans li kull kamra żżid il-produzzjoni b'mod eċċessiv u b'hekk nerġgħu niġu f'sitwazzjoni agħar. Konklużjoni	
		Minkejja li suġġett bħal dan iqajjem emozzjonijiet qawwija kemm f'min għandu din is-sengħa kif ukoll f'min iħobb jara nnar, xorta waħda rridu nkunu għaqlin u nużaw ir-raġuni kull meta nieħdu deċiżjonijiet marbutin ma' dan il-qasam. Flistqarrijiet kollha tagħha, il-KA dejjem enfasizzat l-importanza tal-edukazzjoni. U sa terġa' tagħmel l-istess f'din l-istqarrija. Minkejja li fin-natura tiegħu dan ix-xogħol hu perikoluż, u jsir xi jsir hekk sa jibqa', xorta jistgħu jittieħdu miżuri li jnaqqsu l-periklu. Għalhekk korsijiet edukattivi li jsiru għal min jixtieq li jkollu l-liċenzja għallmanifattura m'għandhomx ikunu ffukati biss fuq il-kisba ta' tagħrif dwar is-sustanzi użati, it-taħlit tagħhom, il-liġijiet u l-miżuri ta' sigurtà. Għandu jkun ipprovdut ukoll taħriġ fl-iżvilupp ta' attitudnijiet u valuri li jwasslu għal bidla fl-imġiba u l-operat ta' min jikseb il-liċenzja. Marbuta ma' dan is-suġġeriment, wieħed iżid li fil-kors ta'	Hemm qbil mal-KA li l-edukazzjoni hija aspett importanti hafna tant li hemm referenza ghalija fis-sezzjoni 1.1. Dan il-kumment gie innutat u mghoddi lil agenziji rispettivi.

Ref no	Name	Summary	Reply
		Licence A għandu jingħata taħriġ fl- immaniġġjar tal-kmamar tan-nar minħabba l-possibbiltà li l-persuna li jkollha dik il- liċenzja tista' tintalab tmexxi kamra tan- nar. Ċertament li dan il-qasam igawdi mill- għerf li nkiseb minn snin twal ta' esperjenza. Madanakollu, l-iżviluppi li seħħew jitolbu li f'pajjiżna tidħol mentalità ta' riċerka f'dan is-settur ukoll (speċjalment fl-iddisinjar ta' kmamar tan-nar). Il-Gvern jista' jgħin f'dan ir-rigward billi jiffaċilita ftehim ma' pajjiżi u/jew organizzazzjonijiet li joffru dawn l-opportunitajiet.	
		Filwaqt li b'sodisfazzjoni tinnota li dan id- dokument hu pass fid-direzzjoni t-tajba, il- KA theġġeġ lil kull min hu kkonċernat sabiex ikompli jahdem b'mod matur sabiex l- industrija piroteknika tkompli tiżviluppa permezz ta' operat aktar responsabbli u sigur. Pajjiżna u ċ-ċittadini tieghu ma jixirqilhom xejn inqas.	Grazzi tal-kumment

#### Ref no

FC/2013/20-2 (submission was not received on time due to an error on www.gov.mt. It was agreed to acknowledge as received on time)

#### **Name**

Joe Louis Caruana and Elsie Caruana B.Sc. (Mediterranean Agro-Eco Systems Management)

## **Summary**

The local farmers in Gharb found it difficult to cultivate their land when there were three fireworks factories dispersed in the most fertile area popular also with Maltese and foreign tourists who come to enjoy the tranquil surroundings.

Moreover, farmers had to abandon much of their land but still had to keep the fireworks surrounding area clear, without any cultivated animal forage, in order to confirm with the law as it is the farmers' duty, to keep the vicinity within a certain distance clear to prevent any danger from catching fire in order to safeguard the fireworks factory.

The distance of large building debris which were blown out from the factories reached the distance of about 700 -800 metres during the last three explosion which happened within a short period of time. (This kind of debris is still there if one would like to have a look. Thank God two explosions happened on Sundays (although still on Sundays this area is still busy with those who come to enjoy the country side) and the other explosion happened at night.

We farmers who would like to encourage agri-tourism, are finding it difficult to do so as these fireworks factories shouldn't be built in such beautiful areas as they spoil or stop all the activity from taking place. Besides, all these fireworks factories lead directly to public roads. The damage to the environment by these explosions is

## Reply

This policy is intended to address planning aspects which also contribute towards increased safety measures. Whilst one understands the unfortunate sequence of events as described, it would be inappropriate to exclude a particular locality solely upon the accident history or other events which are not based on appropriate technical assessments. One also needs to keep in mind that fireworks factory complexes would need to keep stipulated statutory distances from each other and from other structures as stipulated in the policy. Moreover, each proposal is envisaged to be subjected to the technical scrutiny of the ad hoc technical committee indicated in section 3.3.4 as well as the scrutiny (including local council and public scrutiny) contemplated in the planning process.

Ref no	Name	<b>Summary</b> irreparable. These of Gharb are an exception as they created an absolute eyesore.	Reply
		There is no more space for more fireworks factories in the countryside of Gharb. The only existing fireworks factory can cater for all the fireworks needed during the festive season and furthermore these can be bought from Malta if there would be more demand.	
		The referendum in Gharb that took place in 8 December 2010 should be considered as a primary indicator that more fireworks factories are not accepted within our locality.	